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Title :Second-mover Advantage under Strategic Subsidy Policy in a Third Market Model
Authors :Hamada, Kojun
Publisher :Economics Bulletin
Issue Date :Mar-2009
Journal Title :Economics Bulletin
Volume :29
Issue :1
Start Page :407
End Page :415
ISSN :1545-2921
Abstract :"This paper examines which of the Stackelberg leader or its follower has the advantage under strategic subsidy policy in a third market model. We show that even if governments choose export subsidies in whichever of a simultaneousmove or sequential-move game, the leader firm always loses its first-mover advantage in a Stackelberg duopoly. Furthermore, we examine the endogenous timing of subsidies by governments and show that the second-mover advantage occurs with regard to profit and welfare under the endogenous timing of subsidies."
Type Local :学術雑誌論文
Language :eng
Format :application/pdf
URI :http://hdl.handle.net/10191/25687
fullTextURL :http://dspace.lib.niigata-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10191/25687/1/29(1)_407-415.pdf
Appears in Collections:10 査読済論文 = Postprint

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10191/25687